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NOTES
THE NEBULOUS CONGLOMERATE MERGER: ADmINISTRATIVE
AND JuDIciAL TREATMENT
Section 7 of the Clayton Act,' which was originally intended
to prevent secret acquisitions among competitors, 2 referred by
its terms only to stock acquisitions. However, the Supreme Court
in strictly interpreting this section distinguished between stock
and asset acquisitions and refused to incorporate the latter into
the statute.3 The effectiveness of the statute was thus severely
curtailed. In 1950 the Clayton Act was amended so as to
expressly embrace asset acquisitions. This amendment also gave
rise to four major changes enabling those charged with enforce-
ment to effectively deal with the varied forms of mergers which
were affecting competition.4
(1) The new amendment required proof of only reasonable
probability of a substantial lessening of competition rather than
proof of an actual lessening which was previously required.5
(2) Any geographic area could now be used to demonstrate
a potential lessening of competition, whereas under the former
statute, the Government was limited to illustrating this "potentiality"
in a particular competitor's community.'
(3) The new amendment eliminated any need to prove
intent to substantially lessen competition.
7
(4) The jurisdiction of the act now includes acquisition
of any asset of another corporation 8
These changes clearly expressed the congressional intent to
nip monopolies in the bud, by preventing any potential lessening
of competition.' However, it was not until 1957 that the vast
scope of section 7 was fully explored. In deciding United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,10 the Supreme Court stated
138 Stat. 731 (1914).
2 Comment, 46 IL. L. REv. 444 n2 (1951).
3 FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
4 "No corporation . . . shall acquire ... the whole or any part of the
stock... or any part of the as-sets of another corporation . . .where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country the effect . .. nay be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 64 Stat.
1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). (Empha-
sis added.)
5 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
6 Id. at 320.
7 Carter, The Clayton Act, Original Section 7: Re-examination and
Reappraisal, 8 ANTITRUST Bura. 187, 216-17 (1963).
sBrown Shoe Co. v. United States, mpra note 5, at 311 n.18.
9 Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir.
1953); see generally McAllister, Where the Effect May Be to Substantially
Lessen Competition or Tend to Create a Monopoly, ABA ANTITRUST SWTION
124 (1953).
10353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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that section 7 is applicable to all mergers (horizontal, vertical and
conglomerate) provided they may substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly." This blanket application of section
7 caused concern with respect to the validity of all mergers, past,
present and future, especially in the nebulous area of conglomerate
mergers.12
The purpose of this paper is to examine recent administrative
and judicial treatment of those mergers not typically classified
as horizontal or vertical. To aid in our discussion of those newly
developed legal principles applicable to conglomerates, frequent
reference will be made to the following hypothetical merger.
Lynch Flower Seed Mfg. Co., one of the five leading flower
seed producers in America, controls 40% of the market. A total
of five firms, including Lynch, control 93% of the market while
some twenty other firms share in the remaining 7%. Lynch is
negotiating a merger with Silverman Pot Co., the second largest
producer of flowerpots in America. Silverman presently controls
11% of the market while the largest firm in the industry controls
29%. The remainder of the industry is controlled by nine
other firms which in the aggregate form a symmetrical oligopolistic
market structure.'3  An analysis of the legality of such a merger
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act will enable us to highlight
the trend of interpretation set by the Federal Trade Commission.
In order to determine whether this hypothetical is proscribed
by section 7, it must first be classified as one of the three types
of mergers (horizontal, vertical or conglomerate) defined by the
Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.'4
Horizontal and Vertical Mergers
The Supreme Court in Brown defined a horizontal merger
as "an economic arrangement between companies performing
similar functions in the production or sale of comparable goods
or services." '5 Thus, any attempt by a firm to eliminate direct
competition by acquiring competing firms will fail. Our hypo-
thetical merger will not be invalid, however, since Lynch is not
"Id. at 590-93.
12A conglomerate has been termed a merger which does not have the
effect of automatically foreclosing to the competitor any market outlay or
source of supply (vertical) nor does it automatically eliminate a competitor(horizontal). Procter & Gamble Co., TRADE Ra REP,. (1962 Trade Cas.)
115,245, at 20,257 (FTC Dkt. 6901, Jan. 28, 1962).
'3A symmetrical oligopoly is one in which the aggregate firms control an
approximately equal percentage of the market. Blair, The Conglomerate
Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672, 691-94 (1958).
,4Supra note 5, at 317.
151d. at 334; see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S.
271 (1964); Union Carbide Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.),
15,503 (FTC Dkt. 6826, Sept. 25, 1961).
in direct competition with Silverman, neither performing the
same services nor producing similar products.
A vertical merger is the acquisition of either a supplier or
a customer of the acquiring firm. A classic example of a vertical
merger is found in the du Pont case.1 6 Du Pont acquired a sub-
stantial stock interest in General Motors Corporation, an extensive
purchaser of their products. This parental control gave du Pont
a competitive advantage over other suppliers of General Motors
and was therefore disallowed. Our hypothetical has neither a
retail, wholesale nor customer relationship and, therefore, can-
not be held invalid as a vertical merger.
Conglomerate Mergers
A conglomerate merger is one involving firms which are
neither competitors, potential or actual, as in the horizontal
merger, nor customers or suppliers of each other, as in the vertical
merger.1 7  As such the illegal conglomerate merger does not effect
an automatic change in competition, as in the horizontal or vertical,
but it does establish a potential for such change. It is this potential
that section 7 was enacted to prevent. Since our hypothetical
situation is neither horizontal nor vertical, it is necessarily con-
glomerate.
Having properly classified this merger, we must study its
potential effects on competition in order to determine its validity.
In order to declare the merger illegal, the court must find that
it generates the potential of a substantial anticompetitive effect
in a line of commerce. This line of commerce has been defined
as any product or group of products which has sufficient peculiar
characteristics and uses which make it distinguishable from all
other products. 8 Thus, firms are in the same line of commerce
if they service a similar product market in an overlapping geographic
area.'
9
In determining the geographic market we must consider the
particular section of the country where the merger will have an
overlapping competitive effect. In our hypothetical, both firms
are involved in enterprise throughout the United States; therefore,
the geographic market is the entire country.
16 Rogers, U.S. v. du Pont - A Judicial Revision of Section 7, 2 ANTI-
TRUST BuL. 577 (1957).
"7Note, Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 72
YALE J. 1265 (1963).28United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
593 (1957).
'
9 United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 731-35 (E.D.
Mo. 1959), aff'd 370 U.S. 294 (1962); accord, United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963).
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It is more difficult, however, to determine the product market.
The interchangeability of uses for the product"0 and the elasticity of
demand between the product and any of its substitutes are two basic
factors which must be considered in making this determination.
2 1
However, ascertaining the broad product market may not be
sufficient to determine the affected area of competition. The exis-
tence of certain factors of demand may establish well-defined sub-
markets 22 which may point out either similar or distinct lines of
commerce. For example, a five-dollar shoe does not compete with
a thirty-dollar shoe, indicating that specific price ranges are termed
sub-markets, in that they are aimed at different customers. In our
hypothetical, we can see that there is no interchangeability of uses
between flowerpots and flower seeds. Likewise, there is no elasticity
of demand present since an entirely different demand 'is generated
for each product. Therefore, pots and seeds comprise two separate
broad product markets. These broad product markets, however, may
be further subdivided by employing practical indicia of demand
to determine the actual sub-markets. These practical indicia are:
(1) public recognition of the industries as separate industries,23 (2)
uses of the product,2 4 (3) price differentiation, 25 (4) similarity of
production facilities,2 and (5) distinct customers.2 7
The reason for examining such practical indicia was best ex-
pressed by Mr. Justice White in United States v. Continental Can
2 0 An example of interchangeability can be seen in the uses of glass
containers and metal containers. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441 (1964).
21 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 5, at 325-26.
22 Id. at 325.
23 In the acquisition by Procter & Gamble of the Clorox Bleach Co., the
Government established a single product market by demonstrating that Proc-
ter & Gamble was such a well-advertised name that it would have a compe-
titive advantage over the bleach manufacturers by being able to advertise
household detergents and bleach at the same time. Since the public would
tend to identify the products as one, there would be no sub-markets and
therefore the competitive advantage in the single market would argue against
the corporate merger. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 12.
24 In the Alcoa merger, the distinction in use between the products was
sufficient to establish separate (or sub) markets and did not result in a
lessening of competition. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra
note 15.
25 Also in the Alcoa case, the price differentiation between aluminum
and copper conductors was sufficient to contribute to the establishment of
separate sub-markets for each product. United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, supra note 15.
28 In the Ekco merger, the ability of each firm to manufacture the pro-
duct of the other was sufficient to place them in the same sub-market, while in
actuality the products were entirely different. Ekco Prods. Inc-, TRADE REG.
REp. (1964 Trade Cas.) fr 16,879 (FTC Dkt. 8122, Jine 30, 1964).
27 In the Brown Shoe case, the factor of distinct customers (i.c., for
men's, women's and children's shoes) was sufficient to establish separate sub-
markets. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 5, at 326.
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Co.,"' where he reasoned that "since the purpose of delineating a
line of commerce is to provide an adequate basis for measuring the
effects of a given acquisition, its contours must, as nearly as possible,
conform to competitive reality . . . otherwise an adequate deter-
mination of the merger's true impact cannot be made." The prac-
tical indicia are more a judicial tool in determining the validity
of the merger, than an economic reality. This divorce of judicial
analysis and economic reality prompted Mr. Justice Harlan, dis-
senting in Continental Can, to ask whether the potential effect on
competition existed other than in the minds of the court.29
This problem further raises the question whether the Commis-
sion can maneuver the product market to produce any desired
result. Since, in all practicality, it is impossible to attack the pro-
duct market chosen by the Government, the only solution for the
firm would appear to be to present another product market which
it argues is the one more indicative of the merger's effect. By
using this argument, the advantage would appear to be with the
defendant since the burden of proof is on the Commission to es-
tablish a reasonable product market. For this reason it is important
that a careful examination be made into the broad product market
and all the practical indicia which could comprise separate sub-
markets in order to make a proper determination as to the ultimate
line of commerce. In our hypothetical, the practical indicia cannot
be employed to establish a separate sub-market. This does not,
however, establish that the merger is legal.
There are still several other tests developed by the Commission
and the federal courts to determine the validity of conglomerate
mergers. But there has been no agreement among the authorities
as to the effectiveness of those tests."0 Rather than following any
discernible pattern, tests have been applied both singularly3' and
collectively,32 so as to reveal any anticompetitive effects3 3 of a
merger. Thus, the hypothetical merger must be examined in light
of each of the tests to determine if it is proscribed by section 7.
2 8 Supra note 20, at 457.29 Id. at 467-77.30 In a discussion of the newly initiated Trade Regulation Rulings, Com-
missioner Elman underlined the fact that "both big business and government
urgently need . . . a better means of determining, in advance, the probable
legality of proposed mergers." Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's
Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. REv. 385, 391 (1964). See
generally Llewyn & Mann, Some Thoughts on Policy and Enforcement of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 50 A.B.A.J. 154 (1964).
31 Consolidated Foods v. FTC, TRADE REG. TRANS. BINDER (1961-1963)
16,182 (FTC Dkt. 7000, Nov. 15, 1962), rezvd, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.
1964).
32 Procter & Gamble Co., TRADE Ra. TRANS. BINDER (1961-1963)
16,673, at 21,580 (FTC Dkt. 6901, Oct. 26, 1963).
33 See Mueller, The Current Merger Movement and Public Policy, 8
ArIRusT BuLT 629, 641 (1963).
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The Deep Pockets Test
The "deep pockets" test34 is essentially an examination into the
competitive advantages that arise when a merger results in the
acquiring firm having far greater financial resources than its com-
petitors in its new field of endeavor. If the merger results in the
entrance of a firm "with a breadth of experience and degree of
financial strength beyond anything possessed by the existing mem-
bers of the industry," '5 it is well on its way to illegality. 6
This test was further refined to include not only an examina-
tion of financial disparity but also any substantial difference in
technological or administrative resources, as well as the intangible
psychological advantages afforded to a "giant" in a field of
"pygmies."37
The acquisition in our hypothetical will result in the entrance
of a firm with five times the financial worth of the average firm
presently in the industry. However, the disparity is not actually
as great as it first appears. The industry leader has an absolute
worth of six million dollars. As a result of the merger, the hypo-
thetical would have an absolute worth of twelve million dollars.
Compared with the leader, the disparity is not such as will give
rise to the "possibility and power to sell at prices approximating
cost or below and thus to undercut and ravage the less affluent
competition." ' Likewise, since Lynch is a single-product firm,
administrative and technological "deep pockets" probably will not
exist.
However, even if "deep pockets," financial39 or otherwise, was
found to exist, this would not necessarily result in a finding of
illegality.40 It must further be shown that the acquisition had the
reasonable probability of effecting a substantial lessening of com-
34This concept was introduced into the area under consideration by the
Commission in Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Both the Commission and the circuit court expressly rejected using the ver-
tical aspects of the merger as a basis for a finding of illegality. The "truer
picture of anti-competitive effect emerges from even the most cursory con-
sideration of the post acquisition competitive postures of the . .. [firms in
the acquired firm's line of commerce] vis a vis one another." Id. at 229.
3 Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 32, at 21,578.36Accord, Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, supra note 34.
37 Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, supra note 34.
38 Id. at 229-30.
39 All mergers will result, in varying degrees, in financial "deep pockets."
Donnem, The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 283,
284 (1963).
40 The acquisition would be highly suspect, though, if the acquired firm
held a monopolistic position in its line of commerce, for it would "entrench
the monopoly position of the acquired firm and ... strengthen the latter's
ability to repulse new competition." Ekco Prods. Inc., supra note 26, at
21,907.
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petition.41 The intra-industry competition may very well be in-
creased-rather than decreased-where, for example, a small firm
in a given industry, increased in power by the resources of its
merging partner, will be more able to compete with the larger
firms in that industry.4 2
Reciprocity
The concept of reciprocity is another aspect in the examination
of whether the acquiring firm in any way transfers greater leverage
to the acquired firms so as to make it a more formidable competi-
tor. Reciprocity is "the practice whereby firms, overtly or tacitly,43
make concessions to one another in order to promote their own
business interests. Perhaps the most common form of reciprocity
is ...reciprocal buying. In this context it involves nothing more
than the simple idea that 'I will buy from you if you will buy
from me,' or the unspoken 'If I will buy from him, he will buy
from me.' "14
A recent Commission decision45 rested on the theory that the
purchasing power of the acquiring firm will coerce its suppliers to
purchase ir turn from its acquired firm.4 6  The merger therefore
takes on a quasi-vertical character.4 7  The result of such a practice
is to foreclose a portion of the market for intra-industry competi-
tion. If this excluded portion is substantial, the merger cannot
stand since this "vertical" merger is, therefore, anticompetitive.
Opposition to reciprocal buying is based primarily on the fact
that the advantages gained through such practice are not rooted
in superior economic performance, but rather, in a species of econo-
mic power. The practice "distorts the focus of the trader by inter-
posing between him and the traditional competitive factors of price,
4' Union Carbide Corp., TRADE REG. R '. (1961 Trade Cas.) 15,503, at
20,373 (FTC Dkt. 6826, Sept. 25, 1961).42 See United States v. Lever Bros., Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 889 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), where the court said that "by virtue of the . .. [acquiring firm's]
experience, expertise and substantial financial position it was in a much better
position to compete in this market than . . . [the acquired firm] had ever
been."
43 One authority distinguishes between psychological and coercive reci-
procity. The former involves "the power of a large customer, solely by
virtue of the volume of its purchases, to influence the purchases of its sup-
pliers." The latter refers to "overt acts . . . designed to induce purchases
by the supplier." Krash, Tlh Legality of Reciprocity Under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 9 ANTitRUST BULL. 93, 98-99 (1964).
44 Consolidated Foods v. FTC, supra note 31, at 20,975.
45 Consolidated Foods v. FTC, supra note 31.
46 Donnem, upra note 39, at 290.
47 In effect, it is "a merger involving the acquisition not of a supplier, but
of a supplier's supplier." Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 32, at 21,566.
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quality, and service an irrelevant and alien factor which is des-
tructive of fair and free competition on the basis of merit."48
The prerequisites for reciprocal buying are not contained in
our hypothetical. Lynch does not purchase from firms which in
turn purchase from Silverman.
Potential Competition
A recent adjunct to these tests is the concept of potential
competition.4 9  Essentially, this concept "is concerned with specified
existing companies that are considered prospective competitors and
the effect of their removal by merger is taken into account in deter-
mining the changed competitive situation."50
Diversification may be achieved through internal or external
expansion. If diversification is achieved by acquisition, this neces-
sarily eliminates the possibility of the acquiring firm entering into
competition with the acquired firm. Therefore, when diversification
is accomplished through acquisition, where the ability to diversify
through internal expansion is available, this results in a potential
lessening of competition.5' But there must be evidence that the
acquiring firm, in fact, is a potential competitor.
52
In examining the evidence of potential competition exhibited
by the acquiring firm in the hypothetical, the following should be
considered:
(1) ease of conversion of present facilities,
(2) ease of acquiring capital necessary for internal expansion,
and,
(3) geographic potential.
In our hypothetical, the production facilities of both the acquir-
ing (Lynch) and acquired (Silverman) firms are distinctive and
do not lend themselves to conversion. This necessarily results in
an increase in the capital outlay that would be required to di-
versify through internal expansion. Hence, the likelihood of a
finding of potential competition is proportionately decreased.
48 Consolidated Foods v. FTC, supra note 31, at 20,977.
49 See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964);
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
50 Hale & Hale, Potential Competition Under Section 7: The Supreme
Court's Crystal Ball, 1964 SUPREME COURT Rzv. 171, 173.
5' One of the five factors upon which the Commission found Procter &
Gamble's acquisition of Clorox to be in violation of § 7 was "the elimination,
brought about by the merger of Procter as a potential competitor of Clorox
" Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 32, at 21,580.
5 "The test cannot be whfther one of the parties would like to be in
the other party's field but whether, taking into account all economic factors,
there is a likelihood that it would have gone into that field apart from the
merger." Hale & Hale, supra note 50, at 181.
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Geographic potential is exhibited by the fact that both firms
distribute their products on a national scale and service identical
accounts. Therefore, Lynch's present marketing and distribution
methods easily adapt themselves to the sale of flowerpots.
The presence of geographical potential must be evaluated in
light of prior findings. To date, application of the potential com-
petition theory has been limited to instances giving rise to all three
factors.5 3 However, the presence of merely one factor may be of
such import in certain industries so as to support, on its own, a
finding of potential competition.54
Product-Extension Doctrine
The "product-extension doctrine" is applicable to the "merger
of sellers of functionally closely-related products which are not,
however, close substitutes. 5. 5  Thus, the acquisition of a liquid
bleach company by the manufacturer of a wide range of other con-
sumer items was more appropriately described as "a product-
extension merger."56  A merger involving sellers of functionally
closely-related products "may enable significant integration in the
production, distribution or marketing activities of the merging
firms, '57 thus imparting to the merged firms a considerable com-
petitive advantage.
Many of the aspects inherent in a merger of this type can be
found in the hypothetical. Integration at the distribution and mar-
keting levels is readily available since both companies sell their
products to the same customers and use the same merchandising
methods.
Additional cost advantages accrue to the merged firm because
of the close relation of their products from the consumers' view-
5  Each of these three factors was present in United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., supra note 49, where the Court based their finding of a
violation of § 7 solely on the basis of the fact that the acquired firm was a
potential competitor of the acquiring firm.
54The concept of potential competition is well worth scrutinizing. As
recently as 1963 a district court held an acquisition of assets by a firm,
which had all the characteristics of a potential competitor, not to be violative
of § 7. In fact, the factor of potential competition was not even considered.
United States v. Lever Bros., Co., supra note 42. Less than a year later the
Supreme Court based a finding of contravention of § 7 entirely on the concept
of potential competition. United -States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra
note 49. This meteoric rise has not passed unnoticed by the Commission.
See note 51 supra.
55 Procter & Gamble, supra note 32, at 21,565. Commissioner Elman
views the product-extension merger as a variant of the conventional horizontal
merger.
56Id. at 21,566.
571d. at 23,565.
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point. The ability to combine advertising budgets will result in a
substantial increase in advertising exposure per dollar.58
The third level at which the merger may enable significant
integration is that of production. Frequently, acquisitions will be
made by firms that can easily integrate the manufacture of acquired
products into their present production methods. 59 This advantage
will obviously not be available to our hypothetical firms because
of the physical dissimilarity of their products. However, as de-
monstrated previously, the merger does give rise to cost savings
at the distribution and marketing levels which may impart a com-
petitive advantage to the acquired firm. 0 Of course, the question
remains as to whether the competitive advantages accruing would
substantially lessen competition, or. tend to create a monopoly.
Substantiality & Probability
Underlying all of the tests considered is the qualification that
even if anticompetitive effects were established, the merger would
not fail unless these effects were substantial. "Substantial" has
been interpreted to mean "substantiality within the line of commerce
involved, not substantiality in any absolute monetary terms. "61
The conglomerate merger does not have the automatic effect on
competition present in conventional horizontal and vertical mergers.
Thus, the determination of "substantiality" rests primarily on
reasonable probability. Hence, it need not be proven that the
merger did, in fact, have anticompetitive consequences, but merely
that the merger creates a reasonable probability of lessening com-
petition.6
2
Essentially, reasonable probability is determined by an exam-
ination of the merger under the previously outlined tests. That
outline is by no means intended to be a complete delineation of
all tests, but rather, indicative of current and possibly future merger
movements.
58 See generally Procter & Gamble Co., TRADE REG. TRANS. BINDER (1961-
1963) 1 16,673, at 21,580 (FTC Dkt. 6901, Oct. 26, 1963).
59 E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United
States v. Lever Bros., supra note 42; Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 58.
80"[I]f the product markets served by the acquiring and acquired com-
panies are closely tied together, it is possible that substantial competitive ad-
vantages may accrue.. . ." United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp.
761, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).81 Ekco Prods., Inc., TRADE RIco. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 1116,879, at
21,901 (FTC Dkt. 8122, June 30, 1964); accord, United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964), where although the decrease in com-
petition was a mere 1.3 per cent, the fact that the acquired company ranked
among the top ten producers in both lines of commerce under scrutiny led the
Court to conclude that the lessening of competition was substantial. Id. at 281.
82 Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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Conclusion
These tests have arisen primarily as a result of an attempt
by the Commission and the federal courts to deal with modem
economic developments. The conglomerate merger is an invention
fathered by the need to achieve the diversification necessary for
economic growth and often for business survival. In formulating
tests applicable to conglomerate mergers, the authorities have re-
peatedly underlined the fact that they are in no sense establishing
per se rules of illegality. Rather, they are attempting to deal with
the individual aspects of each merger-separate and distinct from
previous decisions. It is all too easy to disregard these disclaimers
and regard the tests as establishing per se rules.
It would be economically convenient if definite rules were
clearly drawn and uniformly accepted so as to enable the lawyer
to more accurately evaluate a proposed conglomerate merger. In
their stead, tests have been developed and applied to meet the
varied economic arrangements presented. Future proposed mergers
must first be examined under each of these tests, and then the
individual finding must be compared and evaluated in order to
determine the cumulative effect of the merger upon competition.
AcCESS OF THE UNINCORPORATED AssociATIoN TO THE FEDRAL
COURTS: VENUE AND DivEnsiTY REsTRICTIONS
The constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction to the
federal courts extends "to Controversies . . . between Citizens
of different States ... ." 1 In Strawbridge v. Curtis 2 the United
States Supreme Court declared that in order to satisfy the require-
ments of diversity it must appear that there is complete diversity,
i.e., no plaintiff being of the same citizenship as any defendant.
According to common-law principles, an unincorporated association
was deemed a citizen of each state wherein a member of the
association was domiciled. 3 The requirement of complete diversity
in a case involving a large unincorporated labor union or a joint
stock company may be a practical impossibility since, in most
cases, at least one member of the association will be a citizen of
the same state as an adverse party. Thus, unless there is a
federal question, these associations are excluded from the federal
2 U.S. COwsT. art III, § 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1) (1964).
27 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
s Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
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